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INTRODUCTION
Corporate human rights responsibility has become central to
global governance. My 2004 article, Multinational Corporations and
the Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,' addressed
the gap in international human rights law between the growth in
corporate power and the erosion of state regulatory sovereignty. It
asserted that corporate control over government policy meant that
transnational corporations (TNCs) 2 as well as states must be held
* Dr. Daniel Aguirre is a lecturer in International Law and Human Rights at
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aguirred@regents.ac.uk.
1. Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53 (2004) [hereinafter
Aguirre, Multinational Corporations].
2. This essay will use the term "transnational corporation" (TNC) to define "an
economic entity operating in more than one country, or a cluster of economic
entities operating in two or more countries - whatever their legal form, whether in
their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or
collectively." U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. On the Promotion &
Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, 1 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003)
[hereinafter U.N. Norms]. TNC is the term used by the United Nations Special
Representative to refer to all corporate business activity. See Comm'n on Hum. Rts.
Res. 2005/69, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 59th Sess., Apr. 20, 2005 [hereinafter 2005 Mandate], available at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN 4-RES-2005-69.doc
(original mandate to the Special Representative); Hum. Rts. Council Res. 8/7,
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responsible for economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR). But the
problem has always been that states are either unwilling or unable to
fulfil their ESCR obligations. Despite economic globalization, states
still have the obligation to respect, promote, and protect human rights
law. Instead, they consistently limit their own ESCR policy space
through investment and trade agreements guaranteeing corporate
rights.
As the human rights impact of globalization became apparent in
the 1990s, civil society called for an accountability shift from states to
TNCs as the state-centric system seemed exclusionary and
increasingly irrelevant. 3  The target for human rights advocates
became obvious: wealthy TNCs that take advantage of double
standards in the "home" and "host" state to profit amidst human rights
violations.4
There is no doubt that TNCs must be held accountable for their
direct violations of human rights either under national or international
law. Nonetheless, corporate responsibility for the positive obligations
to fulfil ESCR is more complex as these commitments are tailored to
states. Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights called for direct obligations on TNCs for
ESCR in addition to state obligations. This was a naYve assertion in an
era of neoliberal economic globalization that undermines the
willingness and ability of 160 state parties' to fulfil their obligations
Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 28th
Sess., June 18, 2008 [hereinafter 2008 Mandate], available at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/AHRCRES_8_7.pdf (renewing
the Special Representative's 2005 mandate until 2011).
3. See generally Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational
Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45 (1964); ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 6 (2006); HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
(Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); DAVID KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE
WORLD (1995).
4. For further analysis of the role of home and host state see infra Part III and
note 67.
5. Treaty Status: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-3&chapter-4&lang=en (last visited Oct. 17, 2011)
[hereinafter Treaty Status]. For the full text of the Convention see International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
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under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights.6 How can responsibility be extended to hundreds of thousands
of TNCs if states and are increasingly unwilling and unable to regulate
them? The logistics of an international regulatory system seem
unfeasible. There is no central international body capable of
monitoring the myriad activities of countless TNCs. My previous
paper proposed corporate responsibility, but in hindsight, the
realisation of ESCR requires the regulation of TNCs and should
remain the gambit of governments.
Reliance on state responsibility alone has failed to secure ESCR.
These rights can only be realised through international cooperation.
Rather than shifting responsibility to TNCs alone, this essay proposes
an obligation that states regulate ESCR as part of a comprehensive
commitment that includes voluntary corporate initiatives, national
legislation, and international cooperation to reduce globalization's
deregulatory pressures. It concedes, however, that a lack of political
will on the part of the international community will likely undermine
this strategy.
This revisit to my 2004 article also reviews the challenge of
corporate liability for ESCR, the complications of which I originally
underestimated. My prior position was based on an adversarial
activist point of view that left little room for progressive discourse on
the subject, despite its moral force. The work of the United Nations
Special Representative for Business and Human Rights has done
much to reconcile civil society with corporate interests and states.
This essay examines the U.N. "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
framework (U.N. Framework)7 and the U.N. Guiding Principles on
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESC].
6. Article 2.1 of the covenant requires states to "take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation.. .to the maximum of its available
resources," to progressively fulfil ESCR. See ICESC, supra note 5. It recommends
the adoption of legislative measures. On the impact of economic globalization on
the willingness and ability of states, see DANIEL AGUIRRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 19-24 (2008) [hereinafter AGUIRRE,
GLOBALIZED WORLD].
7. U.N. Special Rep. of the Sec'y-Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnat'1 Corps. & Other Bus. Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a
Framework for Business and Human Rights, Human Rights Council, 8th Sess.,
Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
U.N. Framework].
1252011]
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Implementing the U.N. Framework (U.N. Guiding Principles).8
Despite advances in the new U.N. approach, it does not alter the
underlying problem for ESCR, that is, a lack of commitment to
international cooperation for their achievement. On the contrary,
states have taken steps through bilateral and regional investment
agreements that potentially limit their ability to fulfil ESCR.
I. CORPORATE, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO
REGULATE THE UNREGULATED ECONOMY
A comprehensive system of responsibility undertaken at the
corporate, national, and international levels is required to fulfil ESCR
in a global economy. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives
are not enough to ensure ESCR.9  National regulation and
international organisations need human rights oversight and
coordination. States must coordinate CSR, national regulation, and
international treaties so that they are congruent with human rights law.
This comprehensive approach gleans the practicable elements of CSR,
direct corporate liability, the human rights obligations of both home
and host states, as well as the duties of the international community.
Without international cooperation, many states are unable or
unwilling to hold TNCs liable or assert domestic regulations,
preferring national deregulation and international investment
protection agreements. Likewise, in the absence of national
regulations in both the home and host states, CSR can be reduced to a
mere public relations exercise. Unless TNCs recognize the business
case for addressing human rights impacts, national and international
political motivation evaporates.
The state remains the only full subject of international human
rights law. Whether acting individually or collectively, it is the state
8. U.N. Special Rep. of the Sec'y-Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnat'l Corps. & Other Bus. Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding
Principles].
9. See generally Daniel Aguirre, Corporate Social Responsibility and Human
Rights Law in Africa, 5 AFR. HUM. RTs. L.J. 239 (2005) [hereinafter Aguirre,
Corporate Social Responsibility].
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that ultimately controls international relations.' 0  It creates the
framework and rules in which TNCs operate-a "realist world" of
competitive national interests within a neoliberal global economy." It
is important for human rights advocates to clearly outline why rights-
based global governance is in the interest of states, as direct regulation
of TNCs has repeatedly failed at the international level.' 2
International human rights regulations for business are opposed by
states and TNCs. In its recent effort to regulate business conduct
between 2000 and 2004, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights organized the Draft Norms on the Responsibility of
Transnational Corporations and Other Enterprises with regard to
Human Rights (U.N. Norms).13 These were an ambitious attempt to
assign direct responsibility to TNCs for the full range of human rights.
The Norms were applauded as a progressive "step forward" in
accountability and for providing a valuable tool for civil society to
measure corporate performance.' 5 In addition to the State's primary
10. AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 223-69.
11. DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 251
(2d ed. 2006).
12. For example, the United Nations has previously tried to create binding
norms. The first was through the creation of The Commission on Transnational
Corporations that was mandated to draft regulations. See Fleur Johns, The
Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and
Legal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 893, 897-98 (1994). The Commission produced
draft codes in 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1990. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 902 (2003). All
of these draft codes were discarded and the Commission disbanded in 1992 citing
irreconcilable "north-south" differences in an era of deregulation.
13. U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. On the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights: Draft Norms
Submitted by the Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of
Transnational Corporations Pursuant to Resolution 2002/8, 55th Sess., Prov.
Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (May 30, 2003) [hereinafter U.N.
Draft Norms]. For the final version of the U.N. Norms see U.N. Norms, supra note
2.
14. Aguirre, Multinational Corporations, supra note 1, at 75.
15. See UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 276-302 (3d ed.
2008); Upendra Baxi, Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of
Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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responsibility, the U.N. Norms would bestow upon TNCs obligations
to "promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of, and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national
law."l 6 However, the all-inclusive and adversarial approach of the
Norms made them unworkable in practice as states and TNCs refused
to accept them. The failure of the U.N. Norms reflected the polarized
discourse between civil society and TNCs with states backing TNCs.
The Commission on Human Rights, perhaps wisely, decided to call
for further study of the matter.17
In 2005, the United Nations turned to Special Representative for
Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, to identify and clarify the
standards of corporate responsibility.18 Ruggie's approach combined
international law with the economic reality. He set about clarifying
standards of CSR, elaborating on the role of states in effectively
regulating TNCs, exploring complicity, developing impact
assessments, and compiling best practice on the issues. He criticized
the strategic direction of the U.N. Norms and in doing so faced
opprobrium from civil society.19  Ruggie affirmed primary state
responsibility for ESCR,20 reiterating the state's long-standing legal
16. U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 13, at Art. 1; see also U.N. Norms, supra
note 2, at Art. 1.
17. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Draft Report of the Comm'n, 60th
Sess., Agenda Item 21(b), 1 2004/116, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 (Apr.
22, 2004).
18. See 2005 Mandate, supra note 2.
19. For the full text of submissions and commentary on the U.N. Framework
as well as the U.N. Guiding Principles, see U.N. Sec'y-Gen. Spec. Rep. on Bus. &
Human Rights, Bus. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://www.business-
humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). For
background on the initial framework, see U.N. Sec'y-Gen. Spec. Rep. on Bus. &
Human Rights, The U.N. "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework for Business
and Human Rights, REPORTS-AND-MATERIALS.ORG, available at
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework
.pdf; U.N. Sec'y-Gen. Spec. Rep. on Bus. & Human Rights, Introduction by the
Special Representative, REPORTS-AND-MATERIALS.ORG, available at
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-introduction-to-portal-Jul-2009.doc.
See also 2005 Mandate, supra note 2.
20. See U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts., Interim Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 62d Sess., Prov.
Agenda Item 17, 7, U.N. Doc: E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
6
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obligations.2'
Special Representative Ruggie left behind the adversarial "broad
brush" approach of the 2003 U.N. Norms22 and prepared a three-pillar
framework based on the traditional state "duty to protect human
rights, the business obligation to respect human rights, and the need
for effective remedies." 23 The Human Rights Council unanimously
approved the U.N. Framework in 2008, and extended the Special
Representative's mandate until 2011, with the task of
"operationalizing" and "promoting" the U.N. Framework.24 Then, in
March 2011, Special Representative Ruggie issued the U.N. Guiding
Principles, which were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in June
201 1.25 Despite claims that voluntary, self-regulating CSR was no
longer sufficient,26 no binding international framework ensuring that
corporate activities fulfil human rights obligations emerged despite
recent economic turmoil that "seems to provide proof that the existing
international and national orders have failed to place meaningful
,,27
regulation on corporate actors.
II. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESCR
TNCs have legal personality and have rights and obligations
Interim Report].
21. See id. at 19.
22. Josh Curtis & Shane Darcy, The Right to a Social and International Order
for the Realisation of Human Rights: Article 28 of the Universal Declaration and
International Cooperation, in EXPLORING FUTURE RIGHTS, REDISCOVERING
FORGOTTEN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (David Keane &
Yvonne McDermott eds.) (forthcoming Jan. 2012) (manuscript, at 7) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Curtis & Darcy].
23. Id.; see also U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 7, at (I) B ("States should
... [e]nforce laws . . . requiring business enterprises to respect human rights .....
24. 2008 Mandate, supra note 2.
25. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 8.
26. See John Ruggie, Spec. Rep. of the Sec'y-Gen. on Human Rights and
Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Address to the 65th Sess. of the U.N.
Gen. Assemb. 3 (Oct. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Ruggie Statement], available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie-statement-to-un-gen-
assembly-26-oct-2010.pdf; Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/17/4 (June 16, 2011).
27. Curtis & Darcy, supra note 22.
2011] 129
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under international law.28 Yet, possession of legal personality does
not entail a full range of international legal duties.29 Certainly, private
actors have legal duties not to directly violate human rights.30 The
quandary concerns positive duties of TNCs to fulfil ESCR. A
dichotomy exists between extending ESCR responsibility to TNCs,
while ensuring the state's original-and largely unfulfilled-
responsibility. A recalcitrant state may be pleased to transfer ESCR
responsibility to TNCs. States are already reluctant to legalize ESCR
duties for themselves, calling them political goals instead. Because
ESCR are considered political aspirations, requiring redistribution of
resources from the rich to the poor, they cannot be divorced from
politics. ESCR penetrate state sovereignty, and as a result are
extremely sensitive.
Despite this sensitivity, TNCs should still be held responsible for
ESCR violations, particularly where governments show political will,
enact strict laws, and develop judicial systems capable of adjudicating
ESCR cases.31 This is how regulation is meant to work-where
28. See August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal Framework for
Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 70
(Philip Alston ed., 2005).
29. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, at 179 (Apr. 11).
30. See Reinisch, supra note 28.
31. See U.N. Comm. On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Day of
General Discussion Organized in Cooperation with the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), "The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the
Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic
Production of which He is the Author (Art.15.1(C) Of The Covenant)," Monday, 27
November 2000, The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, The Maastricht Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Background Paper Submitted
by the International Commission of Jurists, 24th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 3, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 (Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines]; U.N.
Comm. On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14 (2000),
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22d Sess.,
Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000), reprinted in Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.6 at 85 (May 13,
2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]; U.N. Comm. On Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002), The Right to Water (Arts. 11
and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29th
8
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victims of direct violations by TNCs, through either negligence or
other unlawful behaviour, have access to national courts or other
remedial mechanisms. 32
Many plaintiffs from developing states have attempted to bring
their cases to foreign courts where the state is connected with the
corporation and the state is willing to use some form of extra-
territorial application of its own or international law.33 However, only
cases alleging violations of the most serious forms of customary
international law or with an indisputable link to the foreign
jurisdiction have resulted in legal standing. Of these cases, none have
found the defendant corporation in violation of human rights law.34
Even limited avenues for holding TNCs accountable in their host
states for the most grievous violations of human rights are under
review with some calling for its dismissal.35 For example, under the
Alien Tort Claims act in the United States, 36 corporations have been
open to civil liability for violations of customary international law for
Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6
at 105 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15].
32. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1349 (2d ed. 2000).
33. See Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In Re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987); Lubbe v. Cape
Plc., [2000] UKHL 41, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545, 1559 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.); Richard Meeran, The Unveiling of Transnational Corporations: A Direct
Approach, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, at 161-65. See generally AGUIRRE,
GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 246-60. See also UPENDRA BAXI, MASS
DISASTER AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (1986) (collection of
documents from In re Union Carbide).
34. On the extraterritorial application of national and international law, see
AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 251-60.
35. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Judicial Foreign Policy We
Cannot Afford, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/ AR2009041702859.html.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). The Alien Tort Statute, also called the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), states: "[t]he district courts [of the United States] shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
2011] 131
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almost two decades. 37 But it is now uncertain whether corporations
will be held liable for acts abroad in United States' courts in the
future.38 Later this year, the United States Supreme Court will decide
if TNCs can continue to be held liable in this way. It is clear that
home states do not wish to put their TNCs at a competitive
disadvantage.
However, corporate responsibility for ESCR would increase
business costs. TNCs would have to enact social welfare programmes
or pay the high taxes associated with them to the state. Therefore,
states enacting ESCR regulations would reduce their global economic
competitiveness, and TNCs would relocate to states without these
onerous regulations. States have spent decades reducing regulation in
order to attract investment and encourage economic growth. Thus,
corporate responsibility for ESCR is antithetical to neoliberal
economics. Corporate investment is the prominent engine of
economic growth, and that growth is necessary to increase the
resources available for ESCR fulfilment. States often face economic
incentives, particularly in developing states, either to forgo regulation
or decline to enforce it.39
Yet, CSR is a voluntary response to civil society and consumer
concerns over human rights that are increasingly viewed as beneficial
by corporations.40 Increasingly, corporations view CSR as essential to
37. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009);
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd. 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007); Bigio v.
Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103-104 (2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d
Cir. 1996); Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005);
Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co. Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258
(N.D. Ala. 2003); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
2000); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2000); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).
38. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011).
For commentary on this case, see Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking 51
VA. J. INT'L L. 353 (2011).
39. See AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 226-242.
40. See Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing International
Legal Obligations of Companies, INT'L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTs. POL'Y (Feb. 2002),
10
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risk aversion and as good public relations. It may even be profitable
in the long term.41 CSR initiatives, at best, complement human rights
law and, at worst, distract from it. For example, the initiatives do not
address globalization's political and structural challenges to ESCR.
TNCs do not have a public mandate. In prosperous economic times,
costly CSR can work. Voluntary measures are quickly revoked upon
an economic downturn. A corporation can go bankrupt or divest.
While TNCs have accepted a certain level of social responsibility, this
acceptance has not yet crystallized into international legal obligations
concerning ESCR.
Nevertheless, few commentators in 2004 could have guessed that
chief executive officers of TNCs around the world would voluntarily
consider their corporate impact on human rights at board meetings
with shareholders. In 2011, many major TNCs have responded to
external pressures and put in place CSR frameworks.42 For example,
the U.N.'s Global Compact, "the world's largest corporate citizenship
and sustainability initiative," boasts over 6,000 business participants, 4 3
while newspapers regularly cover issues related to business and
human rights.44 The growth of CSR indicates it is good for business.45
This new bottom line may ease state perceptions that social regulation
drives away foreign investment, thereby freeing policy room for
ESCR realisation.
Despite advances associated with voluntary CSR initiatives, the
international community, led by the U.N. Special Representative, has
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107 report-en.pdf; Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex
Mercatoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 177-78.
41. See generally Marc Vilanova, Josep Maria Lozano & Daniel Arenas,
Exploring the Nature of the Relationship Between CSR and Competitiveness, 87 J.
Bus. ETHICS 57 (2009); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Big Idea:
Creating Shared Value, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan. 1, 2011, at 2.
42. See generally Aguirre, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 9, at
263-65.
43. U.N. Global Compact Participants, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last
updated July 28, 2011).
44. For information on the plethora of business and human rights issues, see
the news summaries at BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
http://www.business-humanrights.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
45. Steinhardt, supra note 40, at 180.
2011] 133
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attempted to delineate responsibility and provide guidance for
corporate operations in conjunction with human rights. The U.N.
Guiding Principles outline a "corporate responsibility to respect
human rights." 46  The term "responsibility" rather than "duty"
indicates that there are not currently direct corporate obligations under
human rights law. Nevertheless, "respect" suggests a duty to mitigate
indirect impacts linked to their operations.47 TNCs also should go
beyond respect to "know and show" that they are meeting their human
rights responsibilities. 4 8 This requires a rights-based due diligence
process involving impact assessments, integration of human rights
across corporate operations, as well as tracking and communicating
performance. As indicated in the U.N. Guiding Principles, the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights is distinct from issues
of legal liability and enforcement, as these remain defined by national
law in relevant jurisdictions. 49
However, because it is not economically feasible for the state to
regulate all corporate activity within its jurisdiction, states rely on
corporate self-regulation. Self-regulation is voluntary and unlikely to
address corporate indirect impacts or positive obligations for ESCR
that remain the gambit of states. 50 Although TNCs increasingly
recognize the interdependence between themselves and the
community,51 few are willing to accept the positive obligations of
ESCR. This lack of regulatory coordination at the state and
international level means that TNCs can choose which host in which
to do business, avoiding any meaningful protection of ESCR. Each
state still needs to regulate foreign investment within its jurisdiction to
ensure compatibility with ESCR policy. 52
46. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, at (II).
47. But see id. at para. 11 ("Business enterprises . . . should avoid infringing
on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with
which they are involved.").
48. Ruggie Statement, supra note 26.
49. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, at para. 12.
50. See Aguirre, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 9, at 263-65.
51. Id. at 246.
52. MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 113-14
(1995).
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III. STATE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ESCR
Human rights law imposes duties on states to protect, promote,
and fulfil all human rights, which, in a global economy, require the
regulation of non-state actors such as TNCs. There is mounting
pressure on states to hold TNCs responsible if they violate human
rights.54 The U.N. Guiding Principles indicate in Article A.1 that
"[s]tates must protect against human rights abuse within their territory
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises.
This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish
and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation,
regulations and adjudication." In order to do so, the U.N. Guiding
Principles explain that states must enforce human rights laws on
business, ensure that corporate law does not constrain business's
ability to respect human rights, provide guidance, and encourage
TNCs to share best practices.
The responsibility to horizontally regulate TNCs was outlined
clearly in Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.56 The African Commission's
ruling on the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Center and
the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria57 demonstrated
this legal responsibility. The Commission found the Nigerian
government had violated ESCR by failing to prevent conduct that
inhibits ESCR realisation. As is the case with most international
human rights bodies, however, the recommendations of the African
Human Rights Commission have no binding force in international
law. In the absence of international human rights courts with
enforcement capability, national level regulations, enforceable through
national courts, remain the most effective mechanisms for ESCR
53. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND How WE USE IT 95-96 (1994).
54. See FORSYTHE, supra note 11, at 218; MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (6th ed. 2008).
55. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, at para. 3.
56. See Aguirre, Multinational Corporations, supra note 1, at 65-69.
57. Soc. & Econ. Rts. Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Econ. &
Soc. Rts. v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, Summary of Facts, at paras. 46-57 (Afr.
Comm'n on Hum. & Peoples' Rts. 2001), available at
http://www.achpr.org/english/DecisonCommunication/Nigeria/Comm.155-96.pdf.
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realisation.ss Governments can impose liability on those who violate
the law' 9 regardless of the corporate context. Thus, human rights law
enforcement requires attuning domestic procedures with international
law.
States must ensure that foreign TNCs contribute to and do not
prevent the progressive realisation of ESCR. Failure to do so is not
the failure of international law but the failure of states to implement it.
The United Nations Special Representative finds that the role of states
in relation to human rights is critical: "[t]he debate about business and
human rights would be far less pressing if all Governments faithfully
executed their own laws and fulfilled their international obligations."60
Without binding international mechanisms, the reluctance of states to
make ESCR justiciable makes these rights even more difficult to
enforce.
Despite its lack of direct enforcement, the majority of states have
ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 6 1 Accordingly, the state has a due diligence responsibility to
ensure TNCs do not deprive individuals of their ESCR.62 If the state
fails to control the behaviour of TNCs, the state should be held
responsible. 63 Treaty body commentaries from the past decade now
pressure states to fulfil this duty in relation to corporate activities. For
example, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has
outlined the obligation to regulate private actors in relation to the right
64 6to water and health.65
Yet, home states and host states have clear economic disincentives
to regulate TNCs. 66 Host states are dependent on TNCs for capital
58. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 32, at 987.
59. Stephens, supra note 3, at 60.
60. Interim Report, supra note 20, at para.79.
61. See Treaty Status, supra note 5.
62. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 31, at para. 18.
63. Id.
64. General Comment No. 15, supra note 31, at 23.
65. General Comment No. 14, supra note 31, at 35.
66. See AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 31; Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi, Introduction: Globalization and the Challenge of Governance, in
TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 4 (David Held & Mathias
Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 23-25 (2003).
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investment and economic growth and home states are reluctant to
impose stringent regulations that would hamper corporate
competitiveness. 67 All states are subject to the threat of corporate
relocation, yet unregulated economic globalization risks undermining
the U.N. human rights protection system.
This system is further undermined by the neoliberal agenda of
investment deregulation, and privatization of government services.
TNCs are increasingly involved in providing services key to ESCR,
such as the maintenance and provision of water infrastructure and
health and education services. According to the U.N. Guiding
Principles, the protect function of states does not end at privatization
or in partnership with the private sector: "[s]tates do not relinquish
their international human rights law obligations when they privatize
the delivery of services that may impact upon the enjoyment of human
rights." 68 Additional steps to protect human rights are required for
TNCs that are owned or controlled by the state, by requiring human
rights due diligence.69 Where states contract with or legislate for
business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the
enjoyment of human rights, they must exercise oversight in order to
meet their international human rights obligations. 70
Much academic discourse has focussed on the increased
independence of TNCs form states and the difficulty of regulating
them as though this is an inevitable evolution of national and
international politics. Yet TNCs are not independent from states.
They depend upon states to deregulate the economy and to privatize
services in order to operate. Moreover, the corporation remains
physically headquartered in the home state and dependent on it for
sales. 7i It reflects the managerial culture of its home state and is
viewed in the host-state as an instrument of the home state. 72 The
corporation remains reliant on its home states to facilitate investment
67. For more on the home and host state conundrum, see Sarah Joseph,
Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights, 46 NETH.
INT'L L. REv. 171, 176-78 (1999).
68. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, at para. 5, cmt.
69. Id. at para. 4.
70. Id. at para. 5.
71. See AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 243.
72. JOHN RALSTON SAUL, THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBALISM AND THE
REINVENTION OF THE WORLD 83 (2005).
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protection abroad through trade agreements, bilateral investment
treaties, and domestic liberalization. TNCs depend upon host-states to
provide protection and rule of law, well-regulated markets, and a
stable political environment. Host-states adopt concessionary policies
in free trade packages, such as tax breaks, lax regulations, and other
conditions favourable to corporate investment, thus making the rules
for the global economy. TNCs carry out the transactions within these
rules. The problem is that these rules are structured to facilitate trade
and investment but may prevent the realisation of ESCR.
IV. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESCR
Corporate initiatives and state responsibility must be supported
internationally. All bilateral and multilateral agreements should take
into account human rights law as they impact other states and their
citizens. International institutions must be judged by the manner in
which they are accountable to those affected. Therefore,
globalization's exclusion of large populations from ESCR indicates a
failure of global governance.
In order to promote legitimacy and accountability, responsibility
for ESCR must be determined within a poorly-governed but
increasingly global world.73 An international legal framework is
needed to govern "institutions for a polity of unprecedented size and
diversity." 74  In practice, human rights are not central to the
governance of globalization. If international economic cooperation is
in conflict with human rights, then the international community's
institutions are flawed and should be revamped. The states that
uphold institutions that undermine ESCR are in violation of their
commitment to international cooperation.
Unregulated economic globalization results in an ideological
market fundamentalism that prevails over all other concerns.75 States
utilize their sovereignty to prevent human rights law from impacting
73. See generally Robert 0. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic
Accountability, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE, supra
note 66, at 130-59.
74. Robert 0. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 1, 12 (2001).
75. See STIGLITZ, supra note 66, at 54-59.
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economic policy. 76  By contrast, investment and trade law are
simultaneously crystallized. This is because the purpose of
globalization is to maximize efficient resource allocation through
market interactions in order to benefit individuals. 78 Other goals, such
as ESCR often are not considered as important as economic growth
and are not enforceable in international law. They may even conflict
with corporate property rights.
However, global governance must be based on the rule of law.
Political will aside, legal obligations for states exist. Beginning with
the League of Nations following World War One,79 and built into the
U.N. Charter,80  the international community has made state
cooperation to fulfil human rights a priority. The Charter of the
United Nations similarly sets this principle at the heart of the
organisation, which has the stated purpose of seeking "to achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion[.]"si
The United Nations system was formulated to guide international
cooperation toward ensuring security, development, and to promote
and protect human rights. 82 Articles 55 and 56 of Chapter IX of the
U.N. Charter on International Economic and Social Cooperation
obliges states to promote "solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems; and international cultural and
educational cooperation" and "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights" through "joint and separate action in co-operation
76. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 47-48 (1990).
77. See Samrat Ganguly, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDA) and a
Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 167
(1999). See generally AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6.
78. See SAUL, supra note 72 at 17-18.
79. See League of Nations Covenant art. 23.
80. A. GLEN MOWER, JR., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC/SOCIAL RIGHTS
(STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS, No. 6) 11 (1985).
81. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
82. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
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with the Organization" for their achievement. 83 The International
Court of Justice, the resolutions of the General Assembly, and the
writings of eminent scholars support the position that the Charter
creates binding human rights obligations for member states. The U.N.
Charter probably entails "a collective duty of member states to take
responsible action to create reasonable living standards both for their
own peoples and for those of other states." 84
The 1968 Tehran Declaration85 and the 1993 Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action86 have also elaborated on the concept of
international cooperation. In 2005, the international community
reaffirmed the U.N. Charter's principle of international cooperation to
solve economic and social problems.87 This includes collective action
to enhance national capabilities for protecting human rights88 through
technical and financial assistance. 89  Notwithstanding this
international legal pedigree, the concept of cooperation is still
considered a political aspiration and not implemented in practice. 90
Following from the United Nations Charter, the requirement for
international cooperation on human rights is codified in Article 28 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.91 Article 28 links global
governance and human rights, stating that "[e]veryone is entitled to a
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."92
83. U.N. Charter art. 55, 56.
84. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (5th ed.
1998).
85. International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, Iran, Apr. 22-May 13,
1968, Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41.
86. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, Part I, 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 157/23
(July 12, 1993).
87. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Sept. 16. 2005).
88. Id. 24.
89. Id. 21.
90. See generally Curtis & Darcy, supra note 22.
91. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 28,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
92. Id. The preamble of the 1993 Vienna Declaration elaborated on the
requirements of an international order based on human rights and solidarity. World
Conference on Human Rights, supra note 86.
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Despite these requirements, the international duties of states to
cooperate in line with Article 28 have not been achieved in practice
and states are reluctant to clearly define them. Sovereignty remains
paramount in international law. Yet, the acceptance of international
human rights law means that sovereignty is no longer exclusive.
Human rights are increasingly part of international relations. This
influence, however, falls short of that afforded other areas of
international law and the international bodies that govern them and
have binding dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the World Trade
Organization or the International Centre for Investment Disputes. In
international economic law, in contrast to their approach to human
rights law, states have proven willing to cooperate internationally,
regulate TNCs, and reduce their national sovereignty over domestic
and international political and economic decision-making.
These efforts to address the impact of globalization on human
rights have brought the need for a just social and international order in
line with Article 28 to the forefront of discussion. For example, in his
Report to the General Assembly in 2000, the U.N. Secretary-General
considered that "an international and social order is one that promotes
the inherent dignity of the human person, respects the right of people
to self-determination and seeks social progress through participatory
development and by promoting equality and non-discrimination in a
peaceful, interdependent and accountable world." 93  Without
international cooperation, the realisation of ESCR is unlikely and the
ability to regulate TNCs in line with ESCR obligations is weakened.
The role of TNCs is central to the impact of globalization, and
international regulation has lagged behind corporate influence and the
protection of corporate interests in international law. The ongoing
problems associated with corporate human rights abuses and global
inequalities caused by the lack of an international economic regulatory
system clearly indicate a failure to achieve a social and international
order in which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be
93. U.N. Secretary-General, Globalization and its Impact on the Full
Enjoyment ofAll Human Rights: Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General, 7,
U.N. Doc. A/55/342 (Aug. 31, 2000); see also High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights:
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Submitted in Accordance with
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/32, 9, E/CN.4/2002/54 (Jan. 15,
2002).
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implemented.
The realisation of Article 28 would provide the foundation upon
which ESCR rights can be secured in a global economy.9 4 As this is
currently not the case, the concept of a right to a just social and
international order is a revolutionary one. This requires a "radical
change in power relations both domestically and internationally," as
current international relations often inhibit the enjoyment of human
rights.95 Neoliberal globalization has not ushered in an era congruent
with Article 28. In fact, the negative impacts of an unjust
international system are often "exacerbated by the negative impacts of
globalization." 96 In order for international human rights cooperation
to be legitimate, it must confront and transform the power relations
that impede it.97
In this context, my work on the right to development built upon
the description of Article 28 as the "embryo" for the 1986 Declaration
on the Right to Development.98 The preamble of the Declaration on
the Right to Development links itself with the entitlement to a "social
and international order in which the rights and freedoms ... can be
fully realized." 99 The right to development is the embodiment of this
radical approach to international law and international relations.100 It
recognizes that the realisation of this right requires changes to the
existing international order. Article 3.3 of the Declaration lays the
primary responsibility upon states to cooperate for the creation of
national and international conditions favourable to human rights
fulfilment.
Yet, globalization ensures that the realisation of ESCR is not
94. See Victor Sidel, The Right to a Just and Peaceful Social and International
Order, 3 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 110, 111 (1998).
95. Stephen P. Marks, Foreword to MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS - WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at vii, x (2007).
96. Id.
97. See Curtis & Darcy, supra note 22, at 8-9.
98. Asbjorn Eide, Human Rights Requirements to Social and Economic
Development, 21 FOOD POLICY 23, 25 (1996). See generally AGUIRRE,
GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6.
99. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, pmbl, 3,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
100. AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 87-118.
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exclusively within a state's own control. The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in the context of poverty
reduction, has stated that it is "deeply aware" of the "structural
obstacles to the eradication of poverty in developing countries," some
of which "lie beyond [states'] control in the contemporary
international order." 01 It links these obligations entailed in Article 28
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on
the Right to Development to address the exigencies of
globalization.102
The common preambular statement of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
emphasizes cooperation for achieving human rights.103 The obligation
of international cooperation for ESCR in the ICESCR recognizes that
states would be unable to fulfil obligations independently. Analysis of
the ICESCR's cooperative responsibilities suggests that states should
take into account the impact of their economic policy on ESCR in
other states. 104
Altering economic policy to ensure that investment and trade
agreements benefitted ECHR would fundamentally change the nature
101. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., Substantive Issues Arising
in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Statement adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights on 4 May 2001, Econ. & Soc. Council, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 5,
21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (May 10, 2001).
102. See id.
103. See common preambular statements in International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966) and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966). In addition, Article 2, T 1 of the
ICESCR states: "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures" (emphasis added).
104. Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties'
Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 191-92 (1987).
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of the global economy. It would require a radical rethink of
international economic cooperation that would affect all economic
policies enacted between states and by international organisations on
behalf of states. This would require changes to all levels of
investment and trade laws, international organisations, and global
economic policy that negatively impacts ESCR. It would have a
major impact on the ability of states to attract investment and would
possibly slow economic growth in the short term as a result. It would
mean regulating globalization in direct opposition to the principles of
neoliberal global governance and market based global capitalism.
V. UNREGULATED GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT PROTECTION LAW
The international community does not regulate economic
globalization according to ESCR law. Instead, a lack of regulation
prevails, allowing states to cooperate bilaterally and regionally to
create investment agreements and treaties protecting corporate
rights. 05 These agreements have an immediate impact on national
economic policy making' 06 and have become central to international
relations.107 States seek foreign investment as a means for economic
development. Although this produces wealth, the system can be
incongruent with ESCR if governments cannot or will not regulate.
Investment protection treaties are contracts between states that
place a priority on protecting property rights of foreign investors from
adverse regulation. 10s These treaties prohibit regulations that impact
investor's property rights and ability to make profits. They also
outlaw expropriation without compensation, including indirect
expropriation, which can mean regulations that inhibit the investor's
corporate activity. These treaties also prohibit performance
requirements that place undue responsibility on investors to share
technology or knowhow, to contribute to infant industry development,
105. On the proliferation of these agreements and their impact on the right to
development and economic cooperation see AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra
note 6, at 119-32.
106. MICHEL CHOSSUDOVsKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY AND THE
NEW WORLD ORDER 24 (2d ed. 2003).
107. ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 18 (2001).
108. AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 132.
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or to transfer capital to domestic populations.' 09 They can also
prevent regulation derived to fulfil positive human rights law
obligations that may require restrictions tantamount to indirect
expropriation or performance requirements. 1 0  Overall, various
investment treaty provisions may prohibit regulations that address
market failures in protecting collective goods such as water, food, the
environment, public health, or even a social welfare system.
While bilateral agreements are intended to encourage investment
by protecting the basic interests of both the capital-importing and
capital-exporting states in international law,"' international relations
are often characterized by dependency. Investment is conducted
under oligopolistic conditions in imperfect markets that afford the
investor, often a corporation, unique opportunities for the exploitation
of resources. This model of international cooperation appears to
dislocate citizens from their ESCR entitlements.
Democracy requires a state to control social and economic
conditions within its jurisdiction, regulating to reflect the will of the
populace. But investment law can take essential political choices out
of the state's hands, much the way that human rights law attempts to
make norms non-negotiable for governments. The proliferation of
these bilateral agreements has the adverse effect of rendering states
more accountable to foreign investors than to local populations.
States are not able to choose their allegiance in terms of
accountability. International investment law compels states to enact
legislation ensuring domestic enforcement of corporate rights. Under
the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States,' 12 TNCs have standing in tribunals
concerning the terms of investment treaties. A number of cases have
raised worrying questions about the legitimate sphere of host state
109. Id. at 132-39.
110. See generally Amr A. Shalankany, Arbitration and the Third World: A
Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism 41 HARV. INT'L L.J.
419 (2000).
111. SHAW, supra note 54, at 838.
112. Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States (ICSID Convention), art. 63, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524. For
commentary, see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY (2001).
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regulation.113 For example, a fee schedule for health care or education
targeted at ensuring equal access and participation could be prohibited
as a performance requirement, or as indirect expropriation, both
prohibited under investment treaties.1 14 Investors could also challenge
the provision of subsidized public services, affirmative action policies,
or a public insurance system as indirect expropriation of market
opportunity.
Discourse on the interaction of the investment law with ESCR is
embryonic. The impact of foreign investment on ESCR has been
neglected due to the fact that it is conducted by TNCs-non-state
actors-and mostly conducted bilaterally. Bilateral investment
treaties purport to be politically neutral and economic in nature,
despite their potential impact, both positive and negative, on the
realisation of ESCR.
Investment agreements and treaties provide the only binding legal
framework for the transfer of private capital between states. This
legal framework for TNCs is devoid of human rights law. In order to
remain relevant, human rights must protect those marginalized by the
exigencies of globalization by empowering local peoples."' In other
words, it must form a bottom line below which no one can fall, no
matter the economic justification. Human rights should be guided by
the entitlements of those alienated by the globalization process, rather
than the property rights of those benefiting from it.116
CONCLUSION
This essay has examined the important and interrelated roles of
the CSR movement, the role of the state in regulating TNCs, and the
obligation of the international community to promote a social and
economic order in which ESCR can be achieved. The international
community is at a critical juncture as the consequences of unregulated
globalization are becoming clear. ESCR are in danger of being
forgotten in a desperate attempt to shore up global capital by
strengthening the rights of corporations vis-h-vis states through
113. See AGUIRRE, GLOBALIZED WORLD, supra note 6, at 163-77.
114. See id at 9.
115. See Koen De Feyter, HUMAN RIGHTS: SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE
MARKET 3 (2005).
116. See id
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investment treaties. The regulatory ability of the state is crucial to the
realisation of ESCR. The international community, if serious about
fulfilling these rights, needs to ensure states are able to do so when
willing.
What began in 2004, with Multinational Corporations and the
Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as research into
the inadequacy of human rights law pertaining to TNCs became a
study on economic globalization and the unwillingness of states to
discharge their human rights obligations both domestically and
through international relations. Human rights law developed at a time
when international relations were the domain of states alone. The
world community envisioned a centrally organized system for
governing security and economic and social development, where
states had responsibility towards their own inhabitants. Little
recognition was given to the scope of interference with human rights
by non-state actors and the international community. The state was
the only actor considered to have the capacity to violate and protect
these rights at the national level. Although the world is now more
polycentric than the post-war climate in which human rights law was
designed, it is states that have created it:
[W]hat may appear in a static analysis as a disempowerment of the
states confronted with a new form of sovereignty competing with
theirs is, it should be remembered, the result of the emergence of a
global marketplace which is initially the creation of the states. Less
than ever should we exculpate states from their alleged inability to
tame the new leviathans.117
The progress in improving corporate human rights performance
has come from the realistic business-oriented case for promotion of
corporate responsibility for ESCR.118 It may be morally repugnant to
base human rights implementation on its profitability, but it is the
bottom line that inspires action in the current international community.
A neoliberal economic order in which governments are to play a
minimal role reduces the scope of government regulation for ESCR.
117. Oliver De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human
Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 28, at 314.
118. See Aguirre, Multinational Corporations, supra note 1, at 76-8 1.
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TNCs are increasingly relevant as privatization and deregulation
occur. What is more, corporate investment is the primary engine of
economic growth and most states are dependent upon it. Civil society
must now advocate to TNCs directly, making the case that it is
profitable to be sustainable and socially responsible. Binding
obligations for global cooperation on non-market initiatives are
considered unrealistic.
Pressure on states for the implementation of human rights law
must be maintained. States are the most accountable entity in
international relations. The monitoring and enforcement of human
rights law remains nationally based and subject to national interests.
States have the legal and political responsibility to fulfil ESCR and
must regulate TNCs accordingly. TNCs-and their home states-
should respect ESCR rights and, in particular, the ability of host-states
to enact ESCR policy. TNCs do not, and perhaps should not, have a
legal responsibility to progressively realise these rights by themselves.
In order to ensure that corporate activity contributes to ESCR, a
fundamental change in international relations must occur. This
requires economic, social, and cultural cooperation. States will have
to accept the redistribution of resources at the national and
international levels. This change does not appear imminent. Instead,
TNCs are given full reign to make as much profit as possible while
addressing human rights in the least expensive way. Given the
political reluctance of states and the scarce resources available for
ESCR, it is unlikely that TNCs will fill the void.
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